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Abstract Human enhancement is a much debated topic
in the bioethical literature. Human beings have long tried to
improve their capacities and their performances through
training and with the aid of tools; but more recently new
means have come to the fore, such as drugs and biotech-
nological devices, especially in the domain of bodily
strength and cognitive powers. Moral enhancement has
been more seldom discussed. However, this question has
recently been hotly debated between two philosophers,
Thomas Douglas and John Harris. Douglas claims that
modulating certain ugly emotions directly would consist in
moral progress—directly, that is, without using cognitive
means like persuasion or deliberation. Harris makes three
objections against this thesis: such a direct neuromodula-
tion would be inefficacious, would put our liberty in
jeopardy and would lead to a moral decline. In this paper, I
examine the third argument: with direct modulation, we
risk intervening too much or too little, inducing an inap-
propriate emotion or an inappropriate level of an otherwise
appropriate emotion—two upshots that will put morality in
jeopardy. I conclude that the validity of this objection
depends on several meta-ethical positions: if you are a
rationalist or think that intentionality and consciousness are
at the core of morality, you will agree with Harris, but if
you are a sentimentalist or someone for whom results
count, you will disagree. Here as elsewhere, ethical ques-
tions cannot be divorced from meta-ethical ones.
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Introduction: The Special Case of Moral Enhancement
Human enhancement is a much debated topic in the
bioethical literature. Human beings have long tried to
improve their capacities and performances through training
and with the aid of tools; but more recently new means
have come to the fore, such as drugs and biotechnological
devices, especially in the domain of bodily strength and
cognitive powers. Doping and cognitive enhancers have
received a very divisive reception, from downright
rejection to enthusiastic promotion. Moral enhancement
has been more seldom mentioned, with the exception of
mood enhancement, a state of mind that has some ethical
impact. Is it for the reason that it is less controversial?
Maybe, because, contrary to the case with much bodily and
cognitive enhancement, the fact that somebody takes a
moral enhancer does not put anybody else in a worse
position: if I become morally better through swallowing a
moral pill, the people who have relations with me may
even benefit. Morality is usually not a competitive context
with winners and losers. Nevertheless, the actual reason
probably lies elsewhere: it exists rather in the fact that we
do not have a clear idea of what exactly ‘morally better’
means and, therefore, what are the appropriate means to
reach such a state. Contrary to the case with cognitive
enhancement, where the goal is known and its content
determinate—to have a better memory consists in being
able to store more information and to retrieve it more
easily—with moral enhancement, the goal has no precise
content. It consists in becoming more moral, but what does
it mean exactly?
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However, this is still not the whole truth, because really
we have some idea of the end and of the means: to be more
generous is to be morally better, and education has been
and still is the classical means of creating less egoistic
attitudes among children. A lot of situations are indeed less
clear. Would improving trust be a sign of moral progress or
would it only create more opportunities for manipulating
people through enhancing credulity? For this case, we
already have a drug at our disposal: oxytocin (Churchland
2011, pp. 75–78). But the fact that there exist fuzzy situ-
ations is not a good reason to claim that we have no notion
of what ‘morally better’ consists of. So, why has moral
enhancement been little discussed to date, despite its
importance? In my opinion, the main reason is that many
authors deem that such an enhancement is not a possible
option. No drug or biotechnological device can afford it.
The argument is rather straight. Imagine that being more
trusting would consist in moral progress and that oxytocin
improves trust; nevertheless, improving trust through
oxytocin would not be moral progress, because nothing
moral can be achieved through a means that bypasses
conscious efforts and cognition.
In this sense, morality is like climbing. Climbing a
mountain is not the same as reaching its top. It depends on
the means used. If a helicopter drops you off at the summit
of the Matterhorn and, after returning, you tell your friends
that you have climbed this beautiful mountain, they will
laugh at you.1 In the same manner, if you claim that you
have become more moral by sniffing oxytocin, you will not
be considered as having performed a moral feat. Conscious
efforts and cognition are required as necessary ingredients
in moral improvement.
Of course, this requirement leaves the door open to
cognitive enhancers with a moral impact. For example, if a
drug could lessen our irrationality concerning long-term
decisions, it would aid morality, but enhancing morality
directly is not possible. This view is very traditional and is
seldom challenged. Nevertheless, some authors have
recently claimed that direct interventions (i.e. interventions
that by-pass cognition) are not necessarily precluded.
Neurological research tends to show that morality has its
base (or one base) in emotions, such as empathy, fear or
anger. Psychopaths are unable to feel empathy and they act
strikingly immorally; if it were possible to induce empathy
in them, they would surely become less immoral persons:
their morality would be enhanced. Morally speaking it
would be a good thing, for them as well as for us. Emotions
can be modified through cognitive means: if I realise that
the dog that is barking at me is a Yorkshire terrier, my
fear will disappear. But they can be modified through
other means, like drugs, i.e. through neuromodulation,
by-passing cognition.2 From a moral point of view, we can
concede to the traditional view that it is better to alter our
emotions through conscious and cognitive means, but what
if they resist our efforts? Would neuromodulation be
morally worthless? This question has recently been the
subject of hot debate between two philosophers, Thomas
Douglas and John Harris. In the next section, I will
examine their disagreement and the underlying reasons. To
my mind, each has a point, and I will develop arguments in
the following sections to show that neuromodulation has a
genuine moral worth in some situations, but that it could
not be a universal means of moral progress if we stick to
the traditional meaning of this expression.
The Debate Between Thomas Douglas and John Harris
In 2008, Thomas Douglas published a paper entitled
‘Moral Enhancement’, in which he claimed that modulat-
ing certain emotions directly would be an act of moral pro-
gress—directly, that is, without using cognitive means like
persuasion or deliberation. To avoid the objection that
there exists no agreement on what immorality consists in,
he chose two ugly emotions or dispositions: racial aversion
and aggressiveness. These emotions are motives for evil
actions as they cause immoral behaviour. Behaviours
prompted by these emotions are immoral because people
are wronged through them, and it is a basic requirement of
every moral doctrine that we should not wrong people;
therefore, there is no difficulty in agreeing that such
emotions are ugly and that it would be morally better if we
could mitigate them.
In his 2008 paper, Douglas states his thesis and answers
possible objections based on bioconservative arguments:
we should accept what is given to us (our emotional
equipment), we ought to improve ourselves through edu-
cative means and biotechnological means are unnatural. I
think that his answers are persuasive, but I will not dwell
on them, because I am interested in another group of
objections—those formulated later by John Harris.
The situation is prima facie paradoxical, because Harris
is well-known for his very positive evaluation of human
enhancement (see for example Harris 2007); but, as we will
see, that is precisely what makes his objections insightful
and relevant. Harris has formulated them in a 2011 paper
entitled ‘Moral Enhancement and Freedom’, and Douglas
summarised them in his answer the same year (Douglas
2011). Three main objections are set out: direct
1 I borrow this example from Schermer (2008, 360).
2 Pharmacological means are not the only tools available for
neuromodulation—think of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
(TMA) or Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). However, the problems
they raise are essentially the same for the debate I will examine;
consequently, pharmacological means will constitute my paradigm.
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neuromodulation of ugly emotions would be inefficacious,
would put our liberty in jeopardy and would lead to a moral
decline. I will make some quick comments on the two first
objections, and then examine the third and its impacts in
greater detail.
The inefficiency objection could be dismissed in three
words: wait and see! (or: try and see!). It is indeed only
when we can point to an impossibility that we should
dispense with useless attempts, and this is not the case
with the modulation of emotions: it is possible, since it
has already been realised with oxytocin and in the
treatment of nervous breakdowns. Of course, the problem
of knowing if it leads to genuine moral enhancement
remains, but this is the gist of the third objection.
Leaving this aside for the moment, it is nevertheless
useful to elaborate a little on the reply to the inefficiency
objection. Neuromodulation could fail, but traditional
means already fail completely in some situations.
Douglas observes that such is the case with some ugly
emotions, for the reason that they have no cognitive
basis. In these cases, there exists unfortunately no target
for traditional means of moral reform. This happens
sometimes with racism: ‘Psychologists and neuroscien-
tists study certain deeply ingrained fear- or disgust-based
responses towards people of different race that seem
aptly characterized as variants of racial aversion (they
are often described as implicit racial bias) but which
entail the presence of no false, stereotypic beliefs.’
(2011, p. 5) The persons affected by those emotional
responses do not entertain any racist belief: their emo-
tions are without a cognitive basis, i.e. a belief that
foreigners are dangerous or inferior. They have correct
beliefs, but do not feel the corresponding emotions.
Here, traditional means of reform are completely ineffi-
cacious; neuromodulation cannot be worse and could
probably do better.
If neuromodulation is efficacious it will endanger our
freedom, says Harris, because it could be used to change
the emotional responses of someone without his consent
or even against his will. However, if neuromodulation
could be employed to diminish freedom, it could be used
to enhance it, too. ‘Suppose that I undergo an inter-
vention that mitigates some of the many emotional bia-
ses that afflict my prudential and moral reasoning, or that
reduces my temptation to act against my sincere nor-
mative judgements. This intervention seems aptly char-
acterized as increasing my freedom to be moral by
removing a brute constraint on that freedom’ (2011,
p. 7), says Douglas, and he is right. A person who
suffers from racist emotions that run against his beliefs
will be relieved by the silencing of these emotions; a
burden will be removed from him and he will be more
free in his relations with foreign people. As is clear, this
question regards freedom of mind and of action, and has
nothing to do with the free will debate.
The moral decline objection is the more serious one
for Douglas, and I agree with him. But what does it
mean exactly? Remember that Douglas’ topic is moral
emotions. As is well-known from Aristotle on—Douglas
and Harris concur—in order to be morally appropriate,
an emotion must be felt at the right level. It is a happy
medium: neither too much, nor too little. If you feel too
much fear, you will probably manifest cowardice in your
behaviour, but if you feel too little you will evince
foolhardiness. You will only be courageous—the morally
correct attitude—if you feel fear at the right level,
somewhere in the middle. In the case of the emotions
studied by Douglas, racial aversion and aggressiveness,
they must be at least lessened: ‘As Harris rightly notes,
the emotion would have to be attenuated to the right
degree. This is because, as Harris puts it, ‘‘the sorts of
traits or dispositions that seem to lead to wickedness or
immorality are also the very same ones required not only
for virtue but for any sort of moral life at all’’’ (2011,
p. 7), observes Douglas. He is not completely convinced
by the argument because, he continues, ‘it is not clear
that xenophobia is, in normal circumstances, at all con-
ducive to morality’, but he concedes the main point.
Before going on, I will add a comment in passing:
xenophobia is not a counter-example, because it is not a
generic emotion but a form of hate (and/or fear) already
in excess: there exist good reasons to be wary of
unknown people, but not to hate them. I return to Harris’
argument. For him, in order to reach this ‘right degree’,
a degree that is a necessary condition to have a correct
moral motivation or to improve it, ‘what is necessary
[…] is the fine tuning of certain emotions in a person-
specific way that is sensitive to prevailing circumstances’
(Douglas 2011, p. 7), and he doubts seriously that this
could be possible through direct modulation. We risk
intervening too much or too little, inducing an inappro-
priate emotion or an inappropriate level of an otherwise
appropriate emotion.
Douglas concedes this point, but replies that it is
sometimes worth running the risk in the face of the ugliness
of these emotions. We must nevertheless be cautious,
because our past history shows numerous examples of
abuses backed by good intentions (think of lobotomy).
Formulated in this manner, Douglas’ proposal is very
modest and Harris’ objection rather easy to satisfy. Harris
himself seems sometimes to avow that his refusal is only a
matter of feasibility, such as when he says: ‘Of course if
ever we do have the prospect of such precise and
unequivocally good producing interventions, I will wel-
come them’ (2011, p. 105). Actual feasibility would cancel
the risk of moral decline.
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Sentimentalism and Rationalism
However, the disagreement between both authors is much
deeper than is shown by the preceding discussion, and
amounts to a meta-ethical one. Each entertains a different
conception of ethics, a sentimentalist one for Douglas and a
rationalist one for Harris. The difference explains why
Harris insists that emotions should only be acted upon
through cognitive means, i.e. indirectly, whereas it is not a
requirement for Douglas. In the papers I have examined,
the difference does not clearly surface, except perhaps in
this observation from Harris: ‘The most important thing
about the prejudices that most, perhaps all of us, have in
one form or another, is to recognize them and learn to be
ashamed of them and above all not to act on them’ (2011,
105). If I have racist beliefs, and if I feel racial aversion,
the requirements of morality are above all to refrain from
acting on their basis, and not to change my beliefs or to
mitigate or eradicate my ugly emotions. Of course, it is
better if I can, but not morally better, since morality is
foremost a matter of action and behaviour. In other words, I
behave morally if I act for the right reasons, and not if I
follow the motives I feel or the false beliefs I have. Reason
tells me not to discriminate against foreigners, not to wrong
them, whatever emotions I feel and whatever beliefs I have.
In this sense, emotions—the topic I am interested in—do
not matter morally.
However, this is not the whole story. In order to be
motivated well, it is of course better to feel correct emo-
tions, and consequently it could be desirable to change our
emotions so that we mitigate or raise them. In order to
succeed at this task, we dispose of cognitive means. But
what if it would be possible to reach this result also through
direct neuromodulation? For Harris, the result will not
count as a moral improvement at all: the only means that
possess moral worth are cognitive, i.e. proceed through
reason. Here, we get to the climbing-a-mountain argument
I mentioned in my introduction: being dropped off by a
helicopter at the top of a mountain does not count as
climbing, and in the same manner mitigating an ugly
emotion by neuromodulation does not count as a moral
improvement.
It is easy to see that this claim buttresses the moral
decline argument in a second sense—or constitutes a sec-
ond argument. If traditional means of moral enhancement
were replaced by non-cognitive ones, this would lead to
moral decline. In the preceding section, we saw Harris’
objection that direct neuromodulation is less sensitive than
cognition in order to modulate emotions in a fine-grained
manner; now we see that it will restrict the field of morality
and replace it by a kind of social engineering.
For Douglas, the situation is of course not quite the
same: if he would probably agree that morality is fore and
foremost a question of action and behaviour, he would not
accept that reason furnishes the only genuine moral
motives. Ultimate moral motives are for him of an emo-
tional nature, so that we cannot act morally if we do not
feel the right emotions. Consequently, the use of any mean
of modifying some ugly emotion that proves efficacious
constitutes a genuine moral enhancement.
Douglas is never explicit concerning his meta-ethical
position—in this sense, what I have said is a kind of
reconstruction—but Harris is of the same mind as me when
he observes that ‘Douglas’s problem seems to me to be that
he equates moral enhancement with having the right feel-
ings’ (2012a, p. 4). Harris himself is quite clear on his own
position, especially in some papers he has written with
Sarah Chan. In one of them, the authors acknowledge that
reason and emotions play their role, but not on a par:
‘Although both emotion and reasoning thus affect moral
decisions, of the two, it must be reasoning that pulls in the
direction of morality’ (Chan and Harris 2011, p. 130). As
we have just seen, to make a moral decision is to decide
upon reason, not upon emotion, because we must weigh the
various values at stake and take into account the many
factors that shape the context of our action. In such a
context, some emotions will be awakened and will moti-
vate the action in a certain direction, but not always the
right one. To know if it is the right one, we must reflect on
the emotions to see if they are adequate in order to promote
the values we want to. To illustrate this point, the authors
mention a study conducted by Molly Crockett and col-
leagues where subjects have been given citalopram, a drug
that modulates serotonin (Chan and Harris 2011,
pp. 130–131). In the Ultimatum Game, the subjects were
more prone to accept unfair offers, because citalopram
heightens their aversion to cause harm. Now, to refuse an
offer, even if it is unfair, is to harm the offerer. In such a
case, observe Harris and Cham, modulation of emotion
through citalopram tends to discount reasoning and rational
attachment to moral values like justice. In one word, it is
moral de-enhancement. Here, we meet the moral decline
argument again.
It follows, as Harris states elsewhere, that a person who
feels that he is not sufficiently altruistic ‘knows what’s
right and needs no moral enhancement, for these purposes
at least. He may need some help in feeling sympathy but
that is a different problem and not, I would suggest, a moral
one’ (2012a, p. 4). Modulating emotions is then devoid of
any moral worth—a rather extreme rationalist claim—and
Harris ends this paper recalling the motto of Socrates, that
a meaningful life cannot be lived without examination of
oneself, concluding that ‘only self-conscious reflection on
conduct can deliver answers to the question as to whether
what one feels is right is indeed right. It is only such an
examination, and the resolve to put its conclusions into
66 Brain Topogr (2014) 27:63–71
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effect, that constitutes a moral life and, a fortiori, a morally
enhanced life’ (2012a, p. 5). Emotions are in need of jus-
tification, they do not justify themselves, because the gut is
not an organ of thought. This claim belongs to the last
quotation I want to offer in order to underline the rationalist
stance adopted by Harris in his ethics: ‘To believe that
emotions can deliver answers to moral dilemmas or gen-
erate moral judgements is like believing that the gut is an
organ of thought, or one that can answer complex, com-
bined theoretical and empirical, questions’ (2012b, p. 4). If
we replace ‘deliver’ by ‘rightly motivate’, we will give
more punch to his thesis, because nobody has ever claimed
that emotion could deliver answers, even an extreme
sentimentalist.
Emotions and Reason in Moral Judgements
The upshot of this debate seems to be that if you are not a
steady opponent to human enhancement, you will accept
direct neuromodulation as a tool for moral improvement or
not, depending on your meta-ethical position. If you are a
rationalist like Harris, following authors like Charles Lar-
more when he states that ‘morality is not possible except
for beings that can respond to reasons’ (2010, p. 2), you
will not, but you will perhaps accept cognitive neuroen-
hancement; if you are a sentimentalist, like Douglas, you
will accept both. If this diagnosis is correct, then the
desirability of by-passing reason in some situations will
depend on a meta-ethical thesis. Hence a new question:
which of these theses is right?
Nowadays, sentimentalism is very widespread, espe-
cially in neuroscience and neuroethics. Jonathan Haidt and
Joshua Greene, for instance, clearly defend such a position.
In order to do that, Greene has devoted a lot of time and
paper to the well-known Trolley Problem, where a trolley
is running downhill and will kill five workers. In a first
version, the switch dilemma, it is possible for a bystander to
hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto a side-track
where only one worker stands. On a second version, the
footbridge dilemma, it is possible to save the five workers’
life too, but only in pushing a fat man off a footbridge in
order to stop the trolley. The upshot of the two versions is
the same: we can save four lives (the five workers minus
the person killed), but when we ask people if they think
that it is permissible to switch the trolley and to throw the
fat man, the answers are very different. In the first case,
almost 90 % think it is permissible, whereas in the second
only 10 % agree (Hauser et al. 2007).
This astonishing result has prompted a lot of research
and reflection. There exist of course several ways to
interpret the discrepancy between the reactions. For
Greene, the best explanation is given by a dual-process
theory: ‘Moral judgment is the product of both intuitive
and rational psychological processes, and it is the product
of what are conventionally thought of as ‘‘affective’’ and
‘‘cognitive’’ mechanisms’ (Cushman et al. 2011, p. 48). In
such a theory, there exist two types of processes that issue a
moral judgement. One is emotional, that is intuitive,
automatic and non-voluntary: it prohibits harming a person
through forceful physical contact, and therefore motivates
the judgement that it is not permissible to throw the fat
man. The second is rational and conscious, motivating the
judgement that it is better that only one person dies rather
than five, and therefore it is permissible to switch the
trolley. If this second process is not activated in the foot-
bridge dilemma, it is because emotion pre-empts reasoning
here (see also Greene et al. 2009).
People are generally not aware of the emotional process;
when they are asked to explain the motivation behind their
decision not to harm the fat man, they make up reasons, but
of course post hoc reasons. As these reasons are discon-
nected from the real causes of their judgements, Greene
speaks of rationalisation, and even of confabulations: ‘We
are all confabulators of a sort. We respond to the conscious
deliverance of our unconscious perceptual, mnemonic, and
emotional processes by fashioning them into a rationally
sensible narrative, and without any awareness that we are
doing so’ (Greene 2008, p. 63). The real causes are emo-
tions. They act independently of reason. This does not
mean that they are devoid of any cognitive basis, because
they are triggered by the perception of a potential harm, but
they are not sensitive to rational considerations. However,
Greene contends, this is not completely true; he thinks that
we have the possibility to become more rational, and
therefore to overcome our emotional reaction, even if he is
not very forthcoming on how we are to do this (Greene
et al. 2004 p. 398). Would Greene eventually become a
rationalist, too? Not exactly, because he claims to be a
follower of David Hume, a famous sentimentalist, in
thinking that the rational process of weighing the goods
and evils that is at the basis of rational morality is grounded
in emotions too, but emotions of another kind. He is
presently devising experiments to put this into a better light
(Cushman et al. 2011, sect. 4).
As we can see, if the controversy between proponents of
direct neuromodulation and their opponents can be framed
as a disagreement between sentimentalists and rationalists,
it can also be framed inside the sentimentalist approach, in
distinguishing between several kinds of emotions, some in
line with reasoning and the others being more or less
impervious to it. For Greene, as for Harris, the impervi-
ousness never seems to be complete; therefore, there seems
always to be a way to modulate these emotions though
cognition and reflection. Does it mean that Greene would
agree with Harris’ position, in that direct neuromodulation
Brain Topogr (2014) 27:63–71 67
123
could lead to moral decline? Not certainly, because as a
strict utilitarian, he thinks that results count morally and
could be tempted, like Peter Singer, to judge that VMPC
patients, i.e. patients with a brain lesion that prevent
emotions from impinging on rationality, could in cer-
tain situations make better moral judgements than ‘normal’
people usually do—‘better’ should obviously be under-
stood in the consequentialist sense of the term, i.e. in
focusing on outcomes rather than on motives or reasons to
act. These patients are justly characterised by a dissociation
between reason and emotions, due to a brain lesion, and
they are less reluctant than us to push the fat man (Koenigs
et al. 2007).3 If a brain lesion can issue in a moral
improvement, it is of course without the mediation of
reason. It is indeed rather counterintuitive and controversial
to suppose that a brain lesion can issue in such an
improvement, but all that I want to insist on is the by-
passing of reason it implies. Consequently if direct neu-
romodulation can result in moral enhancement, it would
certainly be welcomed by Greene.
The Moral Importance of Means versus Ends
The debate between Douglas and Harris was about moti-
vation and action, whereas Greene’s reflections concerned
judgements. This difference is nevertheless irrelevant,
because judgements about what we ought to do, or what is
permissible, are backed by motives. The discussion of
Greene’s position has brought to the fore another distinc-
tion that is more important—the distinction between results
or ends and means. If only results count morally, then
neuromodulation will be welcome if it is efficacious, but if
means also count, it will perhaps not be. The controversy
between Douglas and Harris could be read along these
lines, too, as I have already hinted at. For Harris, even if
neuromodulation is efficacious, it will not count as a moral
enhancement. Two readings can be given for this thesis:
1 Means count morally, and a good end should not be
realised through evil means (this claim for instance is made
in the well-known doctrine of double-effect).
2 Means determine ends. If certain means are chosen,
they will change the meaning of the end. Think of the
climbing-a-mountain argument I have spoken of.
With the first reading, the choice of an inappropriate
means deprives the end of its moral worth, and the action
becomes immoral; with the second, the action could
become immoral, but not necessarily so; nevertheless, it
changes its nature: it is not an action of the same type.
The second reading is the relevant one for the question
addressed here. It has been adopted by bioconservatives.
Leon Kass, for example, asks: ‘Where is biotechnology
taking us? What does it mean for our humanity? What kind
of people do we wish to be and what sort of a society do we
wish to become?’ (2005, p. 225). Means (biotechnology)
and ends (‘the kind of people we want to be’) are inter-
mingled. Will Harris be of the same mind? Not exactly,
because he would probably accept enhancement through
neuromodulation for socially welcomed traits even if it is
not a moral enhancement, because for him, as a moderate
utilitarian, results also count. Following this thread, could
we not say that we should not mind if an improvement is
labelled moral or not as long as it is an improvement,
something that is desirable from a human and social point
of view? Even if pro-social attitudes are not necessarily
moral, depending on how you understand this expression,
they remain desirable.4 Besides, Harris himself seems to be
of this mind and is willing to quit the strict moral point of
view when he states that social and political means are to
be used in order to fix some very important moral problems
like global poverty: ‘If we couple universal education with
the eradication of poverty and more, increasing affluence,
we will I believe be doing the most promising thing as far
as moral enhancement goes’ (2012b, p. 6). Such means by-
pass personal cognition and rationality, of course; they
rather belong to social engineering.
Following this thread does not mean that any means to
change our emotions are acceptable. Some training, in the
guise of A Clockwork Orange or through physical violence,
is clearly not, because it violates values we cherish, but I
think there exist situations where neuromodulation is quite
acceptable. First, for views that give a moral role to emo-
tions in motivation, be it a dual-process theory or not, some
emotions motivating immoral behaviour could well be
immune from rationality, and we could be wise to alter
them directly, if we can. Notice that in so doing we do not
necessarily by-pass any cognitive means, as in taking a pill,
since some kinds of neuromodulation are cognitive, but in
an indirect way. Think of neurofeedback, where computer
games are used: of course, we cannot play without using
our cognitive powers.5 Second, as Douglas has underlined,
some emotions, even if they are not problematic in
3 As an anonymous reviewer rightly observes, if we interpret the
actions of these patients from a moral viewpoint that is not strictly
utilitarian, the situation becomes more complicated, because there is
no evidence that these patients are able to empathize with the
imaginary victim and to judge that each of the two outcomes is bad
because at least one person will be killed or that one outcome is worse
than the other in terms of how many people will be killed. In
consequence, empathy and the capacity to recognize when a person
can be harmed could play no role in their judgement.
4 We could say that pro-social attitudes are moral from the point of
view of society, but not necessarily from the point of view of the
agent. For that, cognition would be necessary.
5 See the paper by Niels Birbaumer in this volume.
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themselves, can be felt at inappropriate levels which resist
reform through cognitive means.
Both situations include degrees. Rational influence is
never excluded and we are able to modulate consciously in
ourselves and in our children appropriate emotional
responses. In this sense, as traditional morality has taught
us, we can fight against vice. But sometimes the vice
continues to escape our rational powers and our conscious
will; in this sense, it becomes a sickness. Of course, it is not
always the case. In The Scarlet Letter, the famous novel
written by Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hester Prynne hates her
husband, and she is aware of this ugly emotion; the author
observes: ‘She upbraided herself for the sentiment, but
could not overcome or lessen it’ (2008, p. 98). In this case,
there is no need to take medicine, voluntary moral reform
is all that is needed—and maybe acceptance of this emo-
tion, because her husband is really hateful. Our attitude in
front of vices and sicknesses is very different, as Tristram
Engelhardt observes: ‘If the individual is placed in a full-
fledged sick role, the sick person is usually held not to be
responsible for being in that role, is excused from social
duties that the illness impairs, and is enjoined to seek
treatment from a set of individuals socially recognized as
appropriate therapists’ (1997, p. 217). If we have other
expectations and demands, it is, Engelhardt adds, for the
reason that ‘medicine focuses primarily on ‘‘caused’’’
phenomena, and ethics on ‘‘chosen’’ ones’. In the case of
sickness, we perceive consequently no difficulty in using
means that by-pass conscience; they do not meet with
objections. If a vice is a condition we should reform,
sickness is a condition we should heal, and neuromodula-
tion seems to be well suited as a form of healing.6 Since the
distinction between vice and sickness is only one of degree,
as I have said, direct neuromodulation would also be well
suited at least for some kinds of moral difficulties. How-
ever, the claim that there exists a continuum between vice
and sickness raises many difficulties, in particular because,
as Engelhardt notices, we react differently to them, socially
and legally. Consequently, we tend to see them apart, as
two separate conditions. In my opinion, the problem of
direct neuromodulation in morality would be a good
opportunity to revise some of our social and legal practices,
but this is the topic of another paper.
We arrive at an analogous conclusion if we reflect on
personal responsibility and integrity. What characterises
human actions is intentionality, i.e. the property to be
directed at an aim or an end. Without intentionality, an
action is not an action, but a physical movement: it only
happens. Intentionality is linked with responsibility,
because I am responsible for what I do when I aim con-
sciously at a goal. However, there exist some conditions
that prevent me from being responsible. If I am coerced or
if my mind is badly confused, my responsibility can be
mitigated, and even cancelled. In other words, I am not
fully responsible if the motives I act upon are not mine.
‘We can be genuine authors of our actions if we are not
impeded in consciously deliberating, choosing, and acting.
If our motivational states are not compelled, coerced, or
manipulated by artificial means, and if we have the
capacity to reflect on, identify with, and execute these
mental states in choices and actions, then we can act freely’
(2007, p. 55), says Walter Glannon. Emotions are, as we
know, amongst the motives of action. The racist feels racial
aversion and is prompted to act upon it. But, as Douglas
has correctly observed, there exist persons who feel such
aversion but reject it because it does not fit with their moral
norms or values. In other words, these emotions are
motives that these persons cannot acknowledge as theirs;
they are like foreign elements put into their minds. Some
cases are clearly pathological—think of obsessive–com-
pulsive disorders (OCD)—but others are not; they just
manifest a moral difficulty. Wouldn’t it be a good thing if,
through direct neuromodulation, we could mitigate or
silence these emotions? It would be a clear benefit for
liberty, as Douglas has said, and for the integrity of the
persons affected—two important values for morality. Of
course, gains in liberty and in integrity do not guarantee
moral progress, in the sense that if the liberty and integrity
of wrong-doers are enhanced, they will be more noxious
for their fellow men. But in another sense, to become more
able to act intentionally is genuine moral progress; it
enhances responsibility. This reminds us that ‘moral
enhancement’ has two senses. First, it designates better
motives and better outcomes: there is moral enhancement if
there is more good and less evil in our actions and in the
world (a world with less racism and racist motives is a
better world). Second, it applies to a better capacity to act
from a moral point of view. Ugly emotions are a hindrance
for both, and therefore neuromodulation can be an aid for
both, too.
Conclusion
I said in my introduction that neuromodulation could pro-
duce genuine moral worth in some situations, but that it
could not be a universal mean of moral progress. Douglas
is therefore right in his claim. But Harris has a point, too, as
far as he insists correctly on the role of reason and
6 A difficult question regards involuntary modulation. If results count
and if their pro-social character can justify direct modulation, then it
can also justify involuntary modulation, as a part of education or of
punishment. Some convicts are already offered the opportunity to
follow a cure—sometimes a harsh one—and consequently to have a
shorter sentence, but it is voluntary. Would it be acceptable to force
them into direct neuromodulation?
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deliberation: morality consist for an important part in their
use. Through this statement he thinks he utters a critique of
Douglas; I am not sure that he is right, because Douglas
would concede much of what he says. However, this point
is not essential for me. What is important in my mind is
that morality is a matter of reason and emotions. Each has
its role. Recent neuroscience has insisted upon the impor-
tance of emotions, showing in particular that empathy is a
component—maybe a necessary one—of conscience or
moral sense. Consequently, some authors have hypothe-
sised that psychopaths, and even some autistic patients,
could not be full participants in our moral community.
Stephen Morse reports that ‘Paul Litton denies that psy-
chopaths are rational at all because they lack any evalua-
tive standards to assess and guide their conduct’ (2008,
p. 209). It is true that psychopaths have a big problem with
morality, but this fact should not hide another from us:
empathy may be necessary for morality, but it cannot be
sufficient. Reason is another necessary component of it,
because morality consists also in reflection and delibera-
tion. It still consists in evaluating emotions, as Harris
reminds us: ‘We will, I believe, always need to use moral
reasoning to act as a guide to our emotions and as a way of
checking that we are having appropriate feelings in
appropriate circumstances and for appropriate objects’
(2012a, p. 4). Moreover, emotions can incorporate some
reason; i.e. they motivate not only as a (blind) cause.7
This duality of reason and emotion should not be
equated with the dualism of dual-process theories which
are now so often offered as explanations of our moral
judgments and motives. I would say that it is not an ‘either-
or’ question, but an ‘and’ one. I think that we have now a
lot of data which point in this direction and have sub-
stantiated claims such as, ‘Determining whether an action
is moral or not does not rely only on affective sensitivity.
Determinations of moral relevance also require the
capacity to integrate a representation of the mental states of
others together with the consequences of their actions’
(Decety et al. 2012, p. 217). Even if emotions are one of
the roots of morality, they are not alone and, moreover, the
roots are far from being the whole plant. This was already
Antonio Damasio’s conclusion in Descartes’Error (1994,
chap. XI).
Emotions and reason are therefore on a par in the
domain of moral enhancement, and if we accept
improvement of the second through direct cognitive
enhancement (like drugs), we should not refuse emotional
enhancement through direct neuromodulation when emo-
tions do not respond to reason, even if conscious efforts
and training should continue to play a prominent role in
both in order to fight cognitive bias and bad habits. Of
course, both enhancements pose normative problems,
moral and conceptual: it is notably difficult to determine
the threshold separating normality from pathological con-
dition, and this has a moral relevance, because it is always
easier to justify an intervention when a condition is med-
ically labelled. My conclusion is only that an absolute
prohibition of direct neuromodulation is not justified,
because of the role emotions play in our moral life, as the
examples afforded by Douglas have shown, and even if it
remains sometimes hard to reach an agreement concerning
which emotions and dispositions are ugly and, more gen-
erally, what it means to become more moral.
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